Restrict network egress and command execution outside the model
Jump & context
Week 10: Governance, Tamper-Evident Ledger & Browser/Computer-Use Agent Security
The five hours
- 01
Concepts & system design
60 min· read · map the mechanismR25 — Docker network & process isolation
R10 — OWASP SSRF & OS Command Injection Cheat Sheets
Read the assigned sections; map the mechanism, threat model and trade-offs.
- 02
Project implementation
120 min· build · integrate · debugEnforce strict network egress allowlists (only approved local/test domains) and block arbitrary shell/OS command execution outside the model in the computer-use worker container.
Build, integrate, debug and improve the increment in the active project.
- 03
Security lab
60 min· attack your own systemAttempt to make the browser agent navigate to an unapproved external domain or internal metadata IP (
169.254.169.254) via webpage redirect or prompt text; prove the infrastructure network policy blocks it.Test the abuse case, failure path, authorization bypass or resource limit.
- 04
Verification & evidence
30 min· test · record evidenceBrowser egress-restriction and command-denial verification tests.
Add or run regression tests; record the 9-point evidence record.
- 05
Deliberate practice & Socratic review
30 min· explain aloud · update gapsAnswer the 8 Socratic questions without notes: What? Why? How? What if? Why not? How can I prove it? Where can it break? What have I learned?
Re-explain the hardest concept aloud, inspect one edge case, update the gap log.
- total5 h
Read today · inside the concepts block
R10 R25Authorization, SQL Injection Prevention, File Upload, SSRF, Secrets Management, and Logging Cheat Sheets.
Daemon surface, Linux namespaces/capabilities, rootless/non-root containers, read-only FS, and secrets.
Read only the named sections needed for today's task. Reading sits inside the 60-minute concepts block; it is not extra time.
Free resources for this day
5 curated- docsDocker · referenceDocker Engine security | Docker Docs
Explains namespaces, cgroups, capabilities and rootless mode, the primitives you use to stop a compromised computer-use worker from reaching the host or executing privileged operations.
R25checked 2026-11-11 - videoDatadog · 7 minContainer Security Fundamentals - Seccomp
Shows how a seccomp profile filters syscalls, which is how you block execve/fork so the worker cannot spawn an arbitrary shell outside the model even if the agent emits a command string.
R25checked 2026-11-11 - videoDatadog · 8 minContainer Security Fundamentals - Linux Capabilities (Part 1)
Explains how capabilities such as CAP_NET_ADMIN and CAP_SYS_ADMIN expand a process's authority, so you can drop them and keep the worker's reach limited to the approved local test domains.
R25checked 2026-11-11 - articleNorthflank · ~10 min readHow to design networking for secure AI-agent sandboxes | Blog — Northflank
Lays out default-deny egress, domain allowlists, DNS controls and credential brokering for agent sandboxes, the concrete policy structure for permitting only approved local/test domains.
R25R10checked 2026-11-11 - repoGitHub · runnable reference setupGitHub - mrinterweb/devcontainer-egress: Hostname-allowlist egress proxy for sandboxed dev environments running coding agents
Provides a working hostname-allowlist proxy configuration for a sandboxed agent container, which you can adapt to prove that only approved domains resolve while all other egress is dropped.
R25checked 2026-11-11
Evidence record · 9-point standard
A lab is complete only when it produces evidence. Installing PyRIT, Garak, Presidio or TransformerLens is not completion. Saved on this device only.
Day notes
emptyThe two source formulations
verbatim · nothing summarisedProject & Deliverable Target
P3 (C6) | `D9` (Computer-Use Pixel Auditor) | M9, M4
Core Implementation
Enforce strict network egress allowlists (only approved local/test domains) and block arbitrary shell/OS command execution outside the model in the computer-use worker container.
Security Lab
Attempt to make the browser agent navigate to an unapproved external domain or internal metadata IP (169.254.169.254) via webpage redirect or prompt text; prove the infrastructure network policy blocks it.
Verification & Evidence
Browser egress-restriction and command-denial verification tests.
Read Today (60m Concepts Block)
R25 (Docker network & process isolation), R10 (OWASP SSRF & OS Command Injection Cheat Sheets).
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