Review tool registry
Jump & context
Week 13: Responsible Disclosure, Cross-Project Architecture Review & Project 1 Hardening
The five hours
- 01
Concepts & system design
60 min· read · map the mechanismR04 — LLM01/LLM06 Excessive Agency
R05 — MITRE ATLAS
R21 — MCP tool boundaries
Read the assigned sections; map the mechanism, threat model and trade-offs.
- 02
Project implementation
120 min· build · integrate · debugAudit
P1tool registry, per-tool authorization, Pydantic schemas, timeouts, retries, and step budgets. Complete `C1` (Autonomous task execution with human approval): generate parameter-bound action previews for sensitive tools, require explicit user approval, and emitD11trajectory ledger events.Build, integrate, debug and improve the increment in the active project.
- 03
Security lab
60 min· attack your own systemRun direct and indirect prompt-injection attacks attempting to bypass
C1approval gates or tamper with approved tool parameters (TOCTOU).Test the abuse case, failure path, authorization bypass or resource limit.
- 04
Verification & evidence
30 min· test · record evidenceP1tool-authorization andC1approval-binding negative test suite.Add or run regression tests; record the 9-point evidence record.
- 05
Deliberate practice & Socratic review
30 min· explain aloud · update gapsAnswer the 8 Socratic questions without notes: What? Why? How? What if? Why not? How can I prove it? Where can it break? What have I learned?
Re-explain the hardest concept aloud, inspect one edge case, update the gap log.
- total5 h
Read today · inside the concepts block
R04 R05 R21Prompt injection, sensitive info disclosure, improper output handling, excessive agency, vector weaknesses, unbounded consumption.
ML attack tactics/techniques: prompt injection, data poisoning, model extraction, and exfiltration.
Official specification: client/server lifecycle, JSON-RPC messages, tool discovery, authorization, and trust boundaries.
Read only the named sections needed for today's task. Reading sits inside the 60-minute concepts block; it is not extra time.
Free resources for this day
5 curated- docsModel Context Protocol · spec sectionSecurity Best Practices
Specifies token audience separation, confused-deputy and SSRF risks, and least-privilege scope models for MCP servers — the normative basis for per-tool authorization in the P1 registry.
R21moved 2026-11-11 - videoNeuralNineModel Context Protocol (MCP): Everything You Need To Know
Builds an MCP server in Python and shows the client/server lifecycle and tool exposure, making the trust boundary between host and server concrete before you audit it.
R21checked 2026-11-11 - videoBugBytesMCP Core Concepts - Resources, Tools, Prompts & Transports!
Separates resources, tools, prompts, and transports, which is the distinction that determines whether a capability needs an argument schema, a timeout, and an approval gate in the tool registry.
R21checked 2026-11-11 - articleOWASP · cheat sheetMCP Security - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series
Covers tool poisoning, rug pulls, cross-server shadowing, and consent re-prompting on definition change — the exact registry-integrity controls behind parameter-bound action previews.
R21R04checked 2026-11-11 - repoOWASP (GitHub) · testing guideOWASP MCP Security Testing Guide
Gives per-threat test procedures including a tool-poisoning sequence diagram from tools/list through model context, so the audit produces reproducible test IDs rather than opinions.
R21R05checked 2026-11-11
Evidence record · 9-point standard
A lab is complete only when it produces evidence. Installing PyRIT, Garak, Presidio or TransformerLens is not completion. Saved on this device only.
Day notes
emptyThe two source formulations
verbatim · nothing summarisedProject & Capability Target
Project 1 Hardening (C1 integration) | S2, S3
Core Implementation
Audit P1 tool registry, per-tool authorization, Pydantic schemas, timeouts, retries, and step budgets. Complete `C1` (Autonomous task execution with human approval): generate parameter-bound action previews for sensitive tools, require explicit user approval, and emit D11 trajectory ledger events.
Security Lab
Run direct and indirect prompt-injection attacks attempting to bypass C1 approval gates or tamper with approved tool parameters (TOCTOU).
Verification & Evidence
P1 tool-authorization and C1 approval-binding negative test suite.
Read Today (60m Concepts Block)
R04 (LLM01/LLM06 Excessive Agency), R05 (MITRE ATLAS), R21 (MCP tool boundaries).
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