Disposable Browser Profile Isolation
Malicious Webpage Prompt Injection
Jump & context
Week 10: Governance, Tamper-Evident Ledger & Browser/Computer-Use Agent Security
The five hours
- 01
Concepts & system design
60 min· read · map the mechanismR33 — Playwright isolated contexts & storage state
R10 — OWASP Session Management
R04 — OWASP LLM01 Indirect Injection
Read the assigned sections; map the mechanism, threat model and trade-offs.
- 02
Project implementation
120 min· build · integrate · debugConfigure Playwright to launch ephemeral, zero-credential browser contexts per task. *Lab:* Prove cookies,
localStorage, and auth tokens cannot leak across separate agent runs or from the host browser.Build a local test webpage containing visible and hidden DOM/CSS instructions attempting to hijack the agent's goal. *Lab:* Prove webpage content is treated strictly as untrusted data and cannot expand the agent's task scope or tool permissions.
Build, integrate, debug and improve the increment in the active project.
- 03
Security lab
60 min· attack your own systemNo separate task text for this block on day 58 — the sourced work sits in the block above. Keep the time box.
Test the abuse case, failure path, authorization bypass or resource limit.
- 04
Verification & evidence
30 min· test · record evidenceBrowser session-isolation test + malicious webpage injection regression test.
Add or run regression tests; record the 9-point evidence record.
- 05
Deliberate practice & Socratic review
30 min· explain aloud · update gapsAnswer the 8 Socratic questions without notes: What? Why? How? What if? Why not? How can I prove it? Where can it break? What have I learned?
Re-explain the hardest concept aloud, inspect one edge case, update the gap log.
- total5 h
Read today · inside the concepts block
R04 R10 R33Prompt injection, sensitive info disclosure, improper output handling, excessive agency, vector weaknesses, unbounded consumption.
Authorization, SQL Injection Prevention, File Upload, SSRF, Secrets Management, and Logging Cheat Sheets.
Isolated BrowserContext, downloads, permissions, screenshots, bounding boxes, locators, and tracing.
Read only the named sections needed for today's task. Reading sits inside the 60-minute concepts block; it is not extra time.
Free resources for this day
5 curated- docsPlaywright · referenceIsolation | Playwright
Defines BrowserContext as a non-persistent, isolated session with its own cookies, localStorage and cache, which is the mechanism you configure to prove state cannot leak between agent runs or from the host browser.
R33checked 2026-11-11 - docsOWASP Gen AI Security Project · referenceOWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025
Frames prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, improper output handling and excessive agency as separate failure classes, which is the checklist you use to show that webpage text cannot expand the agent's task scope or permissions.
R04checked 2026-11-11 - videoMicrosoft Developer · 6 minEpisode 4: Indirect Prompt Injection Explained | AI Red Teaming 101
Explains the data-versus-instruction boundary and demonstrates indirect injection through consumed content, the exact failure you reproduce with a local test page containing visible and hidden DOM/CSS instructions.
R04checked 2026-11-11 - videoByteMonk · 13 minAI Browsers Are Stealing Your Data (Prompt Injection Explained)
Shows how agentic browsers carry live authenticated sessions, so a single injected instruction can exfiltrate cookies or act as the user, motivating disposable zero-credential profiles per task.
R04R33checked 2026-11-11 - repoGoogle Research · runnable code + paperGitHub - google-research/camel-prompt-injection: Code for the paper "Defeating Prompt Injections by Design"
Implements a capability-based control flow where untrusted page data never reaches a privileged planner, giving you a testable reference for proving page content cannot escalate tool permissions.
R04R33checked 2026-11-11
Evidence record · 9-point standard
A lab is complete only when it produces evidence. Installing PyRIT, Garak, Presidio or TransformerLens is not completion. Saved on this device only.
Day notes
emptyThe two source formulations
verbatim · nothing summarisedProject & Deliverable Target
P3 (C6) | `D9` (Computer-Use Pixel Auditor) | M9, S2
Focus 1 (Disposable Browser Profile Isolation — Orig. Day 74)
Configure Playwright to launch ephemeral, zero-credential browser contexts per task. *Lab:* Prove cookies, localStorage, and auth tokens cannot leak across separate agent runs or from the host browser.
Focus 2 (Malicious Webpage Prompt Injection — Orig. Day 75)
Build a local test webpage containing visible and hidden DOM/CSS instructions attempting to hijack the agent's goal. *Lab:* Prove webpage content is treated strictly as untrusted data and cannot expand the agent's task scope or tool permissions.
Verification & Evidence
Browser session-isolation test + malicious webpage injection regression test.
Read Today (60m Concepts Block)
R33 (Playwright isolated contexts & storage state), R10 (OWASP Session Management), R04 (OWASP LLM01 Indirect Injection).
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